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Eighty years ago, in 1934, in Harbin Manchuria, the Russian Fascist Party (RFP) 
held their second party congress and were renamed as the All-Russian Fascist Party. 
This became the most important fascist organization among the Russian emigrants, and 
secretary of the party, Konstantin V. Rodzaevskii, soon established his own leadership 
in the party. The RFP had strong suppo1i from the Japanese military mission in Harbin 
as Russian fascists actively collaborated with it. Under the auspices of the Japanese 
military mission, the RFP expanded their influence on Russian emigrants in Manchuria. 
This paper examines the formation and development of the RFP in Harbin in the 
context of the Russian emigre society and its relationship with the authorities of the 
Japanese puppet state "Manchukuo." Harbin was constructed by the Chinese Eastern 
Railway (CER) as a lodgment of the Russian empire for advancing her dominance into 
northeast Asia. In Harbin, Russians introduced their own institutions and traditional way 
of life, and they managed to retain a type of autonomy, even in the Manchukuo period. 
Furthermore, Soviet citizens and Russian emigrants coexisted in Harbin from 1924 to 
1935, when the CER was a joint venture of the Chinese and the Soviet governments. 
The Russian fascist movement in Harbin was affected by these particular circumstances. 
For a long time, historians have been interested in this unique fascist movement in 
Harbin. The pioneering study on this theme in Western historiography was published 
by Erwin Oberlander, in which he presented an outline of the history of the Russian 
fascist movement in exile. 1 A specialist in Far Eastern history, John Stephan, in his 
distinguished book The Russian Fascists, vividly described the North American and 
. Manchurian fascist movements of Russian emigrants and elaborated on the little known 
history of "Russia abroad."2 Stephan's study had the advantage of using interviews of 
participants in those movements and of contemporary Russian emigrants. Now, we 
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can also utilize new information that was declassified after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Russian historian S. V. Onegina published a shortened version of the report 
of an investigation written by Rodzaevskii that she found in the Central Archives of 
the Ministry of Security (now Federal Security Service).3 This report is especially 
important for analyzing the internal activities of the RFP and for speculating on the 
history of Russian fascism. A. V. Okorokov published a wide-ranging study on fascist 
movements among Russian emigrants all over the world, focusing on Harbin fascists. 4 
Unfortunately, he did not always indicate the source of his information on important 
arguments, although many of his assertions based on archival materials and reprinted 
appendices provide us with new knowledge. In Japan, scholars have paid almost no 
attention to Russian fascism in Manchuria; on the contrary, contemporary Japanese 
agencies have watched these developments carefully from the perspective of pursuing 
Japanese interests. 
Discussions on Russian fascism in Harbin and Manchuria have concentrated on the 
Manchukuo period, but the development of fascism there also has a historical context. 
For understanding the historical significance of Russian fascism in northeast Asia, it 
is important to examine the differences and continuities of thought and movement of 
Russian fascists between the 1920s and 1930s. In this paper, the author first analyzes the 
pre-history of the RFP and proposes that the early Russian fascist movement in Harbin 
consisted of various elements. Second, by examining fascist thought in the 1920s and 
30s, particularly anti-Semitism, this paper analyses the Harbin fascist movement from 
the perspective of comparative fascism studies. Third, the author tries to shed new 
light on the collaboration of Russian fascists with Japanese authorities in Manchuria, 
which contributed to the expansion of the RFP, but imposed large constraints on the 
development of its thought and activities. 
The process of forming the Russian Fascist Party in Harbin 
Although it is unknown exactly when the first fascist circle was organized in 
Harbin, according to Konstantin V. Rodzaevskii 's testimony, it was already founded 
by 1922 by A. N. Pokrovskii, a student of the Law faculty in Harbin, with M. A. 
Matkovskii, B. S. Rumiantsev, P. I. Gribanovskii, and B. A. Liventsov as its members. 5 
However, an account by the Japanese police agency tells us that the fascist group 
in Harbin was created in 1923 as a branch of the Russian Fascist Group, which was 
formed by a Russian emigrant named Pervukhin in Zagreb, Serbia. This account also 
clarifies that the leader of the Harbin branch was Aleksandr Pokrovskii.6 It is possible 
that there was a type of fascist circle of Russian students in Harbin that had connections 
with a foreign fascist organization, although Rodzaevskii himself doubted its existence 
in 1922. 
There is almost no information about any activities of the fascist circle of students 
until 1925. However, in that year, a group of emigrant students led by Matkovskii and 
Pokrovskii began a political campaign against the Soviet Union and formed a secret 
circle named "the Russian fascist movement," which was reorganized into the Russian 
Fascist Organization (RFO) in the same year. Its task was to unite emigrant students in 
fighting against the Soviet regime and to disseminate the anti-Soviet propaganda among 
them.7 So why did Harbin emigre students feel the need to activate a fascist movement? 
As mentioned above, the CER became the Sino-Soviet joint enterprise in 1924, and 
many Soviet citizens arrived in Harbin and Manchuria from the Soviet Union. At the 
same time, Soviet students were newly enrolled in the higher educational institutions in 
Harbin, which were originally established and managed by emigre professors. Conflicts 
between emigrant and Soviet students grew serious, and the student association in the 
Law Faculty was split into two groups: pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet.8 Emigrant students 
were alarmed at the growing presence of Soviet students supported by the Soviet 
authorities in Harbin. In addition, Konstantin Rodzaevskii, the future leader of the 
RFP, emigrated from Blagoveshchensk to Harbin and enrolled in the Law Faculty in 
1925, where he soon became a prominent activist of the anti-Soviet movement and was 
recruited to the fascist organization. 9 
In 1926, Rodzaevskii wrote an article titled "A Note on Fascism" in the Russian 
newspaper Russkoe slovo (Russian word), and he organized a discussion on fascism 
in the Law Faculty. This prompted strong protests from Soviet students, and increased 
the conflict between the pro- and anti-Soviet students. 10 In November of the same year, 
when the ninth anniversary of the October Revolution was held, the fascist organization 
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tried to agitate anti-communist propaganda in Harbin and towns along the CER lines. 11 
Furthermore, in 1927, a student group headed by Rodzaevskii appealed to professor 
Georii K. Gins, the Vice Dean of the Law Faculty about the danger of"red propaganda" 
by Soviet students, and demanded that the Marxist circle in the faculty be terminated. 
The incident caused a big controversy in the faculty between "Reds" and "Whites," and 
Rodzaevskii was suspended for violating student regulations. 12 
Along with anti-Soviet propaganda, Russian fascists also sought to create an 
anti-communist workers movement in Harbin and Manchuria. From the end of 1926, 
Pokrovskii, the founder of the RFO, and Rodzaevskii began to organize so-called fascist 
trade unions by following Italian fascist syndicates. By early 1927, they had organized 
the Union of National Syndicates (UNS) of Russian fascist workers in the Far East, 
which united 12 syndicates. 13 This syndicate network succeeded to integrate some 
Soviet citizens, and they even introduced their fascist propaganda in the Soviet territory 
through their activities. According to the later account of the RFP, 140,000 fascist 
pamphlets were transported to the Soviet Union in 1927 and the first half of 1928. 14 
The RFO began an active propaganda campaign among the Russian emigre youth, 
and the Central Committee of the RFO decided to start publishing its official journal, 
named Fascist. In 1927, it had already issued a typewritten illegal publication Fascist, 
but from June 1928, this journal was printed in a printing house. Owing to the lack of 
official permission for this publication, the publisher Rodzaevskii was quickly arrested. 
However, soon after his release, the RFO managed to publish a second issue of the 
journal in October 1928, followed by three more issues in 1929.15 
From 1929 to 1931, northeast China was in the midst of confusion. When 
Sino-Soviet conflict began in 1929, Soviet influence in northeast China temporarily 
weakened. This led young Russian fascists, as well as the old White guards, to expect 
that the Soviets would withdraw forever, but this perspective was shattered when, by 
the end of year, the Soviet Red Army had defeated Chinese forces, the -interests of the 
Soviet Union in northeast China were restored, and Soviet citizens once again returned. 
Furthermore, when the wave of the Great Depression hit Harbin, it led to a high level 
of unemployment, particularly among young Russian emigrants. 16 In this situation, the 
RFO intended to expand its propaganda not only in Manchuria but also to the Soviet 
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Union, although it lacked the necessary financial resources or activists. 17 
At that time, serious conflicts regarding tactics occurred between the founder of 
the RFO Pokrovskii and other leaders. As a result of this conflict, Rodzaevskii, E. V. 
Korablev, and V. N. Vasilenko left the Central Committee of the RFO and launched 
a new national-revolutionary organization intending to unite all fascist and rightist 
groups. With support from Major General Vladimir D. Kosmin, leader of the People's 
Monarchist Party, they held the first congress in May 1931 that united all fascist groups, 
fascist trade unions, and syndicates. This congress passed the resolution that all fascist 
organizations should be integrated in the form of a political party, and thus emerged the 
RFP. 18 At the congress, General Kosmin was elected president of the party, but the de 
facto leader was general secretary Rodzaevskii. Thus, a new stage in the Russian fascist 
movement had begun in the Far East. 
The thoughts and movements of Russian fascists 
It is well known that these Russian fascists were strongly influenced by the 
successes of the Italian fascist movement. 19 They envisaged following the Italian 
fascist example to battle with the Bolsheviks and establish a new Russian state. From 
this perspective emerged the ideology of Russian fascism. 20 After founding the party, 
Russian fascists explained their reason for choosing Italian fascism as their inspiration. 
The old White guard movement, in their opinion, had failed to fight the Bolsheviks 
because of a lack of a clear and inspiring program for Russia's future.2' Russian fascists 
considered Italian fascism as the third way for searching for a New Russia, dependent 
neither on the simple restoration of the old regime nor the communist regime of the 
Soviet Union. 
In the autumn of 1928, the RFO clearly laid out its basic political line "General 
provisions of the Russian fascist movement," which in many ways anticipated the 
program that was adopted by the RFP in 1931. Russian fascism, the general provision 
insisted, was a religious, national, and labor movement, and its slogan was "God, 
Nation, Labor." The task of the Russian fascist movement was to fight for Russia as 
a Great Power, pursuing "Russia for Russians." To accomplish this purpose, Russian 
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fascists had to carry out "the national revolution," that is, to overthrow the yoke of 
communist officials and Jewish "Nepmen" who were exploiting Russian workers and 
peasants. After the revolution, Russian fascists would construct a "Great National Labor 
Russia" under the aegis of the Orthodox Church. The future Russian state should be 
constructed on the principle of "Religion, Nation and Labor," for which the energy 
of Russian workers, peasants, and various specialists was indispensable. Therefore, 
all working people in Russia should be integrated in national syndicates such as a 
productive syndicate for each enterprise and peasant syndicate . As for ethnic groups 
loyal to the Great Russian state, according to the RFO, they should be considered as 
much Russian nationals as ethnic Russians.22 
Russian fascists elaborated on this political course in the programs of the RFP 
published in 1931 and 1933. According to these programs, fascism was a new politico-
economic doctrine, which would resolve the so-called "cursed social problem" of 
conflict between labor and capital by constructing a corporative state like the Italian 
fascist state. It was expected that fascism would establish a new social system based 
on "solidarity" of all classes and harmony of ethnic groups. The RFO would carry 
out this doctrine to establish a new "national labor state" in Russia under the slogan 
"God, Nation, Labor."23 According to RFP leaders, the "Russian nation" would 
include not only ethnic Russians but also Belorussian, Tatars, Turks, Caucasians, and 
Siberians, among others, who would merge into a single spiritual body with a common 
consciousness. However, in future Russia, Jewish people would be treated as foreigners 
who have their own Palestinian state .24 As for state structure, workers, peasants, 
and diverse laborers were integrated into national unions (natsional 'nye soiuzy), and 
representatives of these unions would form the All-Russian Zemskii Sobor (Assembly) 
as corporative representatives of all categories of interests. Central and local organs 
of the fascist Russian state were to consist of qualified specialists on the principle 
of competence and a representation of interests.25 In this program, Russian fascists 
expressed their will to fight for this new social system, in which there would be no 
exploitation or class struggle. 
The influence of Italian fascism on the ideals of the Russian fascists can be easily 
perceived, such as the idea of a corporative state comprising national syndicates and 
collaboration between all classes instead of class struggle. On the other hand, as 
German historian H.-D. Lowe has recently stressed, Russian fascism in Harbin was 
deeply rooted in Russian history and traditions, and there were in fact many differences 
between the Italian and Russian strands of fascisms. 26 Indeed, Russian fascism had 
its own pre-revolutionary traditions of Russian nationalist movements, with political 
experience under the old regime and the Orthodox belief. Needless to say, Italian, 
German, and East European variants of fascism also had their historical traditions. We 
can thus say that fascist movements were composed from their own traditional elements 
as well as new characteristics arising from the reactions of the people in each country to 
the impact of the Soviet Union and the communist movement. Therefore, it is important 
not only to search for the traditional origins of each fascist thought but also to compare 
the characteristic aspects of each movement in its own historical perspective. 
In this respect, there are many common elements between Russian and other 
fascisms. First, Russian fascists, as well as contemporary fascists in other countries, 
tried to overcome the crisis of nation by exalting radical nationalism and appealing to 
Orthodox belief in the name of a "Sacred Russia."27 Russian fascists were operating 
under conditions of exile to liberate their motherland from the yoke of Soviet 
communism. However, Russian emigrants in Harbin lived in a traditional Russian world 
despite being in exile, resulting in an identity that was always exposed to a type of 
crisis, confronting the Soviets who lived together in Manchuria. As stateless emigrants, 
the Russian fascists regarded building the Russian national state as a very serious task, 
accepting Mussolini's concept of the fascist state.28 
Second, the Russian fascists also sought a "national revolution" for overthrowing 
the existing political regime. They did not insist on the simple restoration of the old 
Russian regime, as the old White guards put it, but sought a pseudo-revolutionary 
(which was, in essence, authoritarian) reformation of the traditional ruling system. In 
the process of developing such a fascist movement, two tendencies formed: a group of 
ideal fascists who aimed to pursue the Italian model (young fascists led by Rodzaevskii) 
and a group of more traditional-conservative reactionaries who accepted fascist ideas 
(Kosmin's group). Thus, as in other fascist movements, the Russian fascists comprised 
various elements from monarchists and republicans to supporters of a fascist party 
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dictatorship. 29 
Furthermore, Russian fascist movement shared a characteristic with other fascist 
movements. The Russian fascist movement was created among students in Harbin, and 
its leadership consisted of the young generation, similar to many fascist leaders in other 
countries. Among their members, there were also many veterans of the Russian Civil 
War in Siberia,30 discontented with the old leadership of the White guard movement. 
These young fascists accepted the Italian model as a new style in politics, making use of 
pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric, uniforms, new symbols, songs, marches and parades on 
the streets, mass meetings, and so on. This new style of movement also contributed, to 
some extent, in attracting the emigre youth. 
After founding the new party, Harbin fascists elaborated the general structure 
of their party organization, and in 1932, the patty opened a party school with a short 
course program for training its own organizers. Moreover, leaders of the RFP intended 
to establish "the united front of the Russian national revolution" for Russian fascists all 
over the world, and began negotiating for consociation with Anastasii A. Vonsiatskii, 
the leader of "the All-Russian fascist organization" in the United States.31 This led to 
the coalition of the Harbin fascists and Vonsiatslii's group, founding the "All-Russian 
fascist party" in 1934 in Harbin. 32 
However, at the same time, a serious conflict in party leadership in Harbin arose 
behind the scenes between the president of the party General Kosmin and other young 
leaders. According to a later official explanation by the RFP, Kosmin had confused 
the concept of a political party with the notion of political school and intended to 
make the party purely ideological body.33 In 1933, Kosmin divided the party into two 
departments, political and military, and controlled the headquarters of the military 
department, utilizing it for his own purposes.34 In this way, differences between Kosmin 
and other leaders in the party line gradually became apparent, and Kosmin eventually 
resigned as president of the party and withdrew from the party in September 193 3. 
Thus, members of the military department of the party were also excluded from the 
party.35 After Kosmin's resignation, a successor to the position of president was never 
elected, allowing Rodzaevskii to establish his supremacy over the RFP. 
Anti-Semitism of the Russian fascists 
As for anti-Semitism, which is another characteristic of fascism, it is well known 
that there is a wide difference among countries in the appearance of this phenomenon. 
In Russian fascism, an anti-Semitic tendency was not small, but the extent and the 
background of anti-Semitism among Russian fascists were not consistent in its 
development. As Lowe points out, anti-Semitism among the Russian fascists was to a 
large extent a religious (Orthodox Christian) and traditional, and not based on racism 
like that in Nazi Germany.36 In addition, it is noteworthy that anti-Semitism among the 
Russian fascists did not seem of such importance in the 1920s. Indeed, no later than in 
1927, a pamphlet titled Russia for Russians accused the Jews of governing Russia and 
disseminating communism in China,37 and as previously mentioned, blamed the Jewish 
"Nepmen" for exploiting Russian workers and peasants in their "General provisions" 
in 1928. Despite this, an attack on the Jews in general was rather exiguous in fascist 
publications in 1920s, even in the first program of the RFP in 1931 ( and also the second 
version in 1933) where there were few anti-Semitic expressions. In this respect, the 
Russian fascist's attitude toward the Jews, to some extent, seems to resemble that of 
the Italian fascists, whose anti-Semitism was not a significant principle in their fascist 
ideas. 
However, in 1932, when Harbin fascists began to publish their own organ Natsiia, 
anti-Semitic writings gradually increased. The editorial board of Natsiia included in 
their journal three translations of articles written by Alfred Rosenberg, a notorious 
anti-Semitic ideologue of the Nazi party that emphasized the link between the Jews 
and freemasonry and suggested the exclusion of the Jews from Europe.38 The Russian 
fascists themselves actively participated in denouncing the plot of ruling the world by 
freemasonry. 39 Furthermore, in July 1933, the RFP organized an open forum at the 
Russian Club in Harbin to discuss the problem of freemasonry. The forum had four 
sessions, and it assembled an audience of approximately 6,000 people.40 The summary 
of speeches at the forum was published in 1936, allowing us to know how Harbin 
fascists discussed freemasonry and the Jews at the time. In their opinion, the goal 
of freemasonry was to build a godless world republic that would be ruled by Jews.4 1 
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Russian fascists considered freemasonry and communism as a tool of the Jews for 
achieving its criminal and hateful objectives, which were the conquest of all human 
beings under despotic power. They claimed that only fascism could resist the victorious 
march of the Jews and emerge victorious over their evil forces. 42 It was at this forum 
that the leader of the RFP Rodzaevskii reiterated this classical apportioning of blame 
on the Jews, and insisted that the Russian revolution had been prepared, organized, and 
ca1Tied out by Judeo-masonry.43 
Why did Harbin fascists increase their anti-Semitic tendencies in the 1930s, 
especially after 1932? One reason is that they began to extensively deploy their 
propaganda of virulent anti-Semitism since they had obtained a vehicle in hand for 
preaching their doctrine. At the same time, it is probable that they were also affected 
by aggressive anti-Semitism from Nazi Germany. Founding the party organ in 1932, 
Russian fascists ardently reported fascist movements abroad, particularly the cases of 
Italy and Germany. The Harbin fascists had also paid attention to the national socialist 
movement in Germany, and after 1932, when the Nazi party made great strides in the 
election, Natsiia explicated in detail on the Nazi movement and Hitler's leadership.44 It 
seems that the concern for a central model among Harbin fascists shifted from an Italian 
to a German fascist movement in the early 1930s. The example of Nazi Germany might 
have triggered the traditional Russian anti-Semitism of the Harbin fascists. 
Boris Bresler, who was born in Manchuria in 1918 and lived in Harbin until 
emigrating to the United States in 1937,45 described the changes in conditions for Jews 
in Harbin as follows: 
"The political atmosphere in Harbin changed dramatically from tolerance and 
respect of minorities to hate and harassment. It was a policy of the authorities from 
which there was no recourse. Small wonder that this motivated many in the Jewish 
community of Harbin to seek refuge elsewhere. In the early 1930s some families 
went to Palestine, some left China for the United States and other destinations, 
but most went to Tianjin and Shanghai. It is estimated that in 1931 some thirteen 
thousand Russian Jews lived in Harbin. The next few years saw a massive exodus 
of the Russian Jewish community. By 1935 only about five thousand Jews 
remained in Harbin. "46 
The Manchurian Incident in September 1931, the occupation of Harbin by the Japanese 
Army, and the foundation of the puppet state Manchukuo in 1932 led to a drastic change 
for Russian-speaking communities in Manchuria. The subsequent control of Harbin by 
the Japanese army was not irrelevant to the expansion of anti-Semitism in Harbin and 
Manchuria. The following section discusses this problem in detail. 
Collaboration with the Japanese in Manchuria 
The Japanese police agency reported that, in 1931, when the RFP had been 
founded, there were approximately two hundred members, increasing to eight hundred 
by early 1932. This number dramatically increased again to nearly twenty :fj.ve hundred 
by the end of 1932. After the disengagement of the Kosmin group from the party, there 
were approximately thirty hundred members in the party organization.47 Of course, 
one of the reasons for the RFP's expansion in number was the high level of discontent 
among young emigre Russians who were under pressure of unemployment and 
economic difficulties caused by the Great Depression. At the same time, the RFP also 
enjoyed strong support from the Japanese military mission in Harbin, which exploited 
members of the RFP for its favor to the party. 
Connections between the Russian fascists and the Japanese military began no later 
than in the second half of 1931. When Japanese journalist Jun Oosawa launched the 
publication of an anti-Chinese Russian daily newspaper Kharbinskoe vremia in Harbin 
in September 1931, Rodzaevskii was recruited as one of the Russian correspondents 
for the paper from the Russian emigre newspaper Zaria. Oosawa was an agent from 
the Japanese military mission in Harbin, and organized a secret agency comprising 
Russian emigrants. Through Rodzaevskii, Oosawa became associated with Kosmin and 
offered to help him develop the RFP, promising financial assistance and administrative 
support.48 This allowed the RFP to secure its own funds and to expand activity among 
the Harbin Russians. 
According to later accounts, Russian fascists had already sought closer ties and 
connections with Japanese nationalists prior to the Manchurian incident of 1931, since 
they thought that Japanese expansion in Manchuria would inevitably lead to a clash 
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with the USSR. In their opinion, in order to confront the Euro-American Judeo-masonry 
coalition, it was important for Russian fascists to not only establish peace and friendship 
with Japan but also create a strong union with her.49 Thus, they sought to promote 
collaboration with the Japanese authorities in Harbin. 
Kosmin took the initiative for the early stages of this collaborative effort through 
his private agency. Rodzaevskii declared the types of operations that were carried out 
by the agency: 1 ). local intelligence-elucidation of the plans and the work of Soviet 
organizations in Manchuria; 2) intelligence in the Soviet Union-sending its agents to 
the Soviet Union; 3) to create civil unrest in Harbin in order to provide an excuse for 
the invasion of the Japanese army; 4) to establish a framework for the future armed 
forces in Manchuria for a future war with the USSR.so The Harbin fascists were in fact 
engaged in espionage in Manchuria and in the Soviet Union, and they reported their 
information to the Japanese military. Furthermore, they secretly organized the fascist 
squad, even though it was not very large. 
Rodzaevskii 's declaration gave the impression that he had never engaged in these 
activities; however, as already pointed out by Stephan, he also actively collaborated 
with the Japanese military authorities. At the beginning of 1932, just before the Japanese 
occupation of Harbin, Rodzaevskii himself was at the center of a provocative scandal 
involving the Japanese army. When an attack on a Chinese shop by several fascist 
members triggered a mass clash between the Russians and the Chinese, Rodzaevskii and 
a Japanese newspaperman named Nakamura were sent by Oosawa to the scene of the 
incident in a car with a Japanese flag . He was warned that they might be fired upon, and 
they were indeed shot at near the scene of the conflict. The Japanese consulate protested 
to the Chinese authorities and to the Corps of the Foreign Consuls that the "Chinese 
policemen" deliberately attacked an official Japanese vehicle.s 1 Under the auspices of 
such provocations, several units from the Japanese army occupied Harbin in February 
1932. Another leader of the RFP, Matkovskii, also acted on behalf of Japan by trying to 
suppress antipathy among Harbin Russians against the Japanese authorities.s2 
At the same time, some members of the RFP were responsible for the kidnapping 
of several wealthy Jews in Harbin. In October 1931, a wealthy Jewish grocery store 
owner S. D. Tarasenko had been abducted and held for ransom; he was released in 
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exchange for a ransom of 10,000 yen ( equivalent to $5,000). In March 1932, M. V. 
Kofman, a Jewish pharmacy owner and company executive, was kidnapped and held for 
ransom; he was later killed. In October of the same year, I. Shere!', son of the Jewish 
president of a transportation company, was held and finally released after a ransom of 
20,000 yen was paid. Finally, a promising young Jewish pianist and French citizen, 
Simeon Kaspe, son of the owner of the Hotel Moderne Joseph Kaspe was kidnapped in 
August 1933 and held for ransom of 300,000 yen. After a period of long confinement, 
the unfortunate victim was shot and found dead in December. The arrested criminals 
were members of the RFP and proved to be the same bandits who had committed the 
preceding three abductions of wealthy Jews in Harbin.53 
It was widely believed among Russian speakers at the time that the Japanese 
gendarmerie was deeply involved in these heinous crimes, especially in the Kaspe 
affair. A famous agent of the Japanese military mission in Harbin, Amleto Vespa, 
wrote in his memoirs Secret Agent of Japan that the Japanese gendarmerie had ordered 
Russian fascist bandits to carry out the kidnapping of Simeon Kaspe and others through 
a secretary-interpreter Konstantin Ivanovich Nakamura, who in turn had organized 
the plot with a Russian police inspector Nikolai Martynov.54 An emigre book by 
Alexandre Pernikoff, entitled Bushido, which was a translation of a memoir by a 
Russian interpreter at the Japanese gendarmerie under the pseudonym Oleg Volgin, 
tells us the same story.55 Stephan, relying on descriptions of Balakshin and Pernikoff, 
has argued that the Japanese gendarmerie in Harbin had a strong interest in acquiring 
money through the abduction and ransom of wealthy Jews.56 However, there are also 
some incorrect or deliberately fabricated information contained in these descriptions, 
such as personal names and date of events. Nevertheless, their stories convey valuable 
information that only those directly involved could have known. This means that we 
have to use their information carefully by cross-checking available materials. 
In the archived documents of the Foreign Ministry of Japan, there is no material 
that suggests Japanese involvement in these crimes. If the files of the Japanese 
gendarmerie had survived, it might have clarified a Japanese connection with the 
Russian fascist criminals, but unfortunately the Japanese gendarmerie destroyed its 
Harbin files in 1945. Having said this, it is very likely that the core facts of these cases 
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were never written on these documents in the first place, since it is natural that these 
perpetrators would have wanted to leave no evidence of their crimes. 
Then, did the Japanese gendarmerie carry out the abduction of wealthy men 
in Harbin in order to get money, as Vespa and Pernikoff suggested? At this point, a 
Japanese memoir will support descriptions by these secret agents. The former manager 
of a Japanese newspaper Manshu Nippo (Manchurian Daily) Kaname Tahara wrote in 
his memoires that the Japanese gendarmerie had arrested famous riches in Harbin and 
had demanded ransom according to their property. 57 It is assumed that the Japanese 
gendarmerie spent a large amount of money on proper activities such as to disclose 
opponents and intelligence, and thus, needed a way to finance itself. Moreover, the 
gendarmes wanted to line their own pockets. So the gendarmerie was very interested 
in collecting money by any means possible. On the other hand, Russian fascists in 
Harbin also required a lot of money to maintain their organizational activity. As for 
the harassment of Jews, they did not feel guilty because of their anti-Semitism. On the 
contrary, for them, harassing Jews was part of fulfilling their own cause. Fascist bandits 
and the Japanese gendarmerie seemed to have a common interest in kidnapping wealthy 
Jews for ransom. 
The Kaspe affair in 1933 brought about a large degree of anti-Semitic aggression 
in Harbin. When A. I. Kaufman, leader of Harbin Jewish community, and A. Chambon, 
Vice Consul of the French Consulate in Harbin who was engaged in the investigation 
of the Kaspe case, made critical comments on the incompetence of the Manchurian 
and Japanese authorities, Rodzaevskii and the RFP denounced the Jews extensively.58 
The Japanese General Consulate in Harbin, which was asked to report on the situation 
concerning the Kaspe affair to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, also recognized 
only too clearly that the RFP was under the aegis of the Japanese military authorities. 59 
This meant that the Japanese diplomats could not take effective measures to restrain an 
anti-Semitic atmosphere in Harbin, since they were equally under pressure of (and, at 
the same time, in cooperation with) the Japanese militarists in Manchuria. Anti-Semitic 
harassment by the Harbin fascists on the Jewish community and the implicit support 
from the Japanese militarists caused a large outflow of Jewish people from Harbin.60 As 
a result, the Jewish share in the economic activities in Harbin and Manchuria decreased, 
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allowing Japanese merchants to take their place. We can thus say that Russian fascists 
largely contributed to Japanese advances in the Manchurian economy. 
Conclusion 
Russian fascism in Harbin consisted of various elements, from traditional Russian 
right-wing ideas to contemporary National Socialism in Germany, and was molded in 
its historical context. In its formative period of 1920s, Russian fascism was strongly 
influenced by the successful Italian fascist movement. However, by the 1930s, when 
the Nazi movement made dramatic advances against their enemy with great success, 
the Harbin fascists learned from the German model and began following it in many 
ways. Unlike contemporary fascists in other countries, however, Russian fascists were 
stateless and had to overcome the Soviet Union and liberate their motherland from 
the yoke of communism before establishing their own fascist state. In this respect, the 
thought of Russian fascism was exceedingly idealistic. 
In exile, in Manchuria, Russian fascists made a great leap forward in the early 
1930s. The RFP quickly expanded its influence over the Russian-speaking community, 
and the success in its development was the decisive role played by a close cooperation 
with the Japanese militarists who occupied Manchuria and founded their puppet' state in 
northeast China. This does not mean that the party was accepted among Russian emigre 
society; rather, many Russians recognized it as a louche group of young hooligans. 
Harbin fascists sought collaboration with the Japanese militarists thinking that they 
would be able to fight against the Soviet Union with Japan. At the same time, they were 
soon under the control of the Japanese militarists, since the latter employed Russian 
fascists as Japanese agents for promoting Japanese interests in Harbin and Manchuria. 
Thus, the activities of the Russian fascists were sternly restricted under the guidance of 
the Japanese military authorities. 
In December 1934, the Bureau of Russian Emigre Affairs in Manchukuo was 
established by the initiative of the Japanese military mission in Harbin. The main 
purpose of the Bureau was to integrate and regulate Russian emigrants in Manchukuo 
and represent their interests to the authorities. Leaders of the Bureau would be recruited 
16 Forming the Russian Fascist Party in Harbin 1925- 1933 
from various groups among Russian emigrants, but the Japanese military mission 
deliberately selected them from among members of the RFP and supporters of Ataman 
Grigorii M. Semenov, who had collaborated with the Japanese Army in the Civil War 
in the Far East. Through this Bureau, the Harbin fascists wielded strong administrative 
power in the 1930s over the Russian emigre community in Manchuria. However, in 
1943, when the tide of war in the Pacific region turned against Japan, the RFP was to 
be officially disbanded.61 The existence of the party itself was at the mercy of Japanese 
interests in n011heast Asia. 
* This paper was first presented at the 6th East Asian Conference on Slavic 
Eurasian Studies held at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, on 28th 
June 2014. The author expresses gratitude to Professor Yang Cheng (East China 
Normal University, Shanghai) for his valuable comments. 
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